Putin’s False Flag

The war in Ukraine, and Russia and China’s advocacy of a new multipolar world order, supposedly based upon national sovereignty, has led some to see Vladimir Putin, in particular, as a saviour of sorts.

A few commentators have suggested that, motivated by his love for the Russian people and their culture, Putin is determined to stand against the assault on humanity embodied by the so-called Great Reset.

Unfortunately, this is little more than wishful thinking. Putin does not care about the Russian people, nor any other for that matter. He cares about the Russian state because that is the source of his power and authority and a multipolar world order, ostensibly controlled by Russia, China and the BRICS, is no better than the G7-led, unipolar alternative.

In fact it is hard to distinguish between the two.

The problem is that a small parasite class consider it their right to establish global governance over the Earth’s population. The mode of implementation is a practically irrelevant. Who cares what colour the prison walls are?

On the 25th of July 1998, Vladimir Putin, a former KGB officer, was appointed as the Director of the Federal Security Service (Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti – FSB), by then Russian President Boris Yeltsin. He served in this role for just over a year, leaving on the 9th of August 1999.

He left the the FSB to take up his new appointment as Russian Prime Minister and was soon named by Yeltsin as his successor. Despite his lofty position, few considered Putin capable of winning a presidential election. He had virtually no popular support and faced an opposing coalition aligned against him in the State Duma (Russian Parliament.)

A series of horrific, alleged terrorist attacks markedly changed Putin’s political fortunes. His tough rhetoric and staunch support for military reprisals in response to the Russian apartment bombings transformed his image from a relatively obscure, political non-entity to a great crisis leader.

In December 1999, within a couple of months of the last bombing, Yeltsin unexpectedly resigned. In accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Putin automatically became President. He capitalised on his newfound popularity and soon won his first presidential election in March 2000.

Putin had operational control of the organisation that planned and carried out the Russian apartment bombings. The highly coordinated and well planned operation killed 317 Russian men, women and children and injured approximately 630 more in just 17 days. Putin then exploited the resultant public fear and anger to seize power.

The only reason you don’t know more about it is that Western power brokers treat the people that they rule with equal disdain.

To expose Russia’s pivotal false flag would be to expose their own. Russia had its 9/11 first.

THE RUSSIAN APARTMENT BOMBINGS

On the 22nd of July 1999, in Moscow’s daily morning paper (Moskovskaya Pravda), respected journalist, defence analyst and former Russian Air Force colonel, Aleksander Zhilin, published an article titled “Storm in Moscow.”  Zhilin wrote:

The article garnered relatively little interest. The furtive political environment in the capital was frequently the subject of extraordinary claims and conspiracy theories. However, subsequent events would prompt many to re-read Zhilin’s piece with more interest.

Three weeks after Putin left his post as director of the FSB, at 8pm on the 31st of August, a bomb detonated in a shopping mall on Manezhnaya Square in Moscow. One person died and more than 30 were injured.

On the 2nd of September 1999, the “Liberation Army of Dagestan” supposedly claimed responsibility for the explosion and warned of further attacks.

There is no evidence that a group called the “Liberation Army of Dagestan” ever existed. Despite published claims, no one knew who they were. Local FSB and Ministry of the Interior officials expressed doubt at the time. The Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov hadn’t heard of them and none of the known Islamist extremists or established groups were known to associate with any group of that name.

Later, In 2005, Rizvan Chitigov (a.k.a the American), was killed in Chechnya. The FSB alleged that Chitigov both planned and carried out the Manezhnaya Square bombing and further that he was a CIA asset. Chitigov had no known links to any group called the Liberation Army of Dagestan. So why someone would falsely claim responsibility for a group that didn’t exist remains a mystery.

At 10pm on the 4th of September 1999, in the town of Buynaksk in Dagestan, a car bomb exploded in front of a five story apartment block. The apartments housed the families of Russian border guards. 68 People were killed and approximately 150 injured.

Another anonymous call was received with a vague assertion of responsibility which, unusually for supposed terrorists, didn’t name the group taking credit.

A little after midnight on the 9th of September 1999, a bomb detonated in the basement of 19 Gyryanova Street, Moscow. 106 People were murdered and 249 injured in the blast as the building collapsed.

The city mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, reacted by blaming terrorists without any real evidence that any terrorist group was responsible.
FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev, who had replaced Putin as the head of the organisation, said that they had recovered samples from the site of the blast:

[T]races of Hexogen (RDX) and TNT were discovered. This already indicates that the explosion was definitely not an accident.

Prime Minister Putin announced that a day of national mourning would be held on the 13th of September.

The 13th of September 1999 was marked by another terrible explosion. A bomb detonated in the basement of an apartment building on Kashirskoye Highway in Moscow. 124 People died and more than 200 were injured. The day of mourning took on an even more poignant significance.

Prime Minister Putin responded and said:

Those who organized and planned this series of cruel terrorist attacks have far-reaching plans. They count on creating political tension in Russia.

The same day, the 13th, two bombs were discovered and made safe in the warehouse on Borisovskiye Prudy Street and in the Kapotnya raion (district). Shortly after the bombing the speaker of the State Duma, Gennady Seleznyov, announced:

I have just received a report. According to information from Rostov-on-Don, an apartment building in the city of Volgodonsk was blown up last night.

The Volgodonsk attack didn’t happen on the 12th of September. The Volgodonsk tragedy struck four days later on the 16th of September. Evidently Seleznyov had been given advanced knowledge of an alleged terrorist attack that had yet to occur.

Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the head of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), later recalled that Seleznyov received the information on a note handed to him by a member of the Duma secretariat (civil service) and then read it aloud at a meeting of the Duma Council.

In the early hours of Monday the 16th of September 1999, a truck bomb blew up outside an apartment in Volgodonsk. Another 18 people were slaughtered and approximately 200 were injured. Again no identifiable terrorist group or individual claimed responsibility.

Following the bombing Vladimir Zhirinovsky was the only State Duma deputy to question Seleznyov about the apparent foreknowledge. He asked Seleznyov:

Look at what’s happening in our country! Do you remember? [. . .] [Y]ou told us on Monday that a house in Volgodonsk had been blown up, three days before the explosion [. . .] How did it happen: they report to you that at 11 a.m. a house was blown up, but the Rostov regional administration was not aware that you had been informed about it? Everyone goes to sleep, three days later there’s an explosion.

Seleznyov did not offer a meaningful response and died in 2015 having never provided a cogent answer. In 2002 he said that the note referred to an improvised hand-grenade incident that occurred in Volgodonsk on the 12th of September 1999.

This minor incident, which barely made the local news in Volgodonsk, didn’t kill anyone and did not “blow up” an apartment building. Nonetheless, it became the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation’s official rationale for Seleznyov’s statement.

Russian state officials unequivocally told the Russian people who they should blame for the attacks. Regardless of that fact that they had produced no evidence to support their contention, they vociferously accused Chechen extremists. President Yeltsin said that all transport links and border crossings in and out of Chechnya would be blocked to protect the rest of the country from further atrocities.

Alexandre Zdanovich, FSB spokesman, said:

The people who organise these missions, who prepare the explosives, who deliver them and have overall responsibility for everything that has happened are obviously in Chechnya. I can say with the utmost certainty, I can guarantee you, that they come from the training camps of Khattab and Basayev.

Thus, the narrative was set. There was no evidence to support this tale offered by Russian officials at the time, and little more today.

One of the suspected masterminds behind the bombing, Ibn al Khattab, denied any involvement. If he was responsible, his denial made no sense.

Khattab had previously threatened that Russian’s would face explosions “blasting through their cities.” Taking responsibility for the apartment bombings would therefore have demonstrated his ability to deliver on his threats. Yet, far from glorifying his great victory, Khattab reportedly said:

We would not like to be akin to those who kill sleeping civilians with bombs and shells.

Indeed, many expressed surprise that the supposed terrorists were deliberately killing poorer, working Russian families. They usually struck Russian government or military targets. There seemed to be a sick logic to the Buynaksk attack, but the Moscow and Volgodonsk apartment bombings were anomalous.

It was the deliberate murder of civilians that caused widespread public alarm. The nation rallied behind its political leaders. Check points were set up across the country, local citizen patrols were established and volunteers worked with the authorities to search apartment block basements and other potential targets.
Vladimir Putin emerged as a tough guy, telling the State Duma:

We have to grit our teeth, I’m calling on you to be more disciplined and vigilant, in deeds, not words.

Disciplined and vigilant deeds set the right tone for a terrified nation. While Russia had experience terror attacks in peace time before, it had never been subjected to anything like the string of apartment bombings. The specific targeting of ordinary Russian men, women and children sleeping in their beds, in such a systematic and barbarous campaign, was entirely new.

With no end in sight, many people, especially those residing in urban Russia, were living in a state of fear. In their distress, they looked to their political leaders to save them.

THE RYAZAN INCIDENT

On the night of the 22nd of September 1999, at around 8.30pm in the central Russian city of Ryazan, local police were alerted to a suspicious group and their vehicle by a vigilant citizen named Alexei Kartofelnikov. The police responded, arriving at 14/16 Novoselov Street, just before 9.30pm, to find that the vehicle and its occupants had left the scene.

Kartofelnikov told them that he had seen two men, in the company of a woman, carrying large sacks down into the basement. The head of the Ryazan bomb squad, Yuri Tkachenko, subsequently disarmed a 150kg bomb with a detonator set to explode the device at 5.30am on the morning of the 23rd.

Yuri Tkachenko was the head of the Engineering and Technical Department of the Ryazan Public Security Police. His team comprised of 13 highly trained officers who regularly updated their expertise and were required to pass Russian state technical exams every two years to demonstrate their current national security and bomb disposal knowledge.

On the night that the device was found Yuri Tkachenko gave a statment to the local press:

There were three bags, the one in the middle had a hole in it. There was an electronic watch inside with wires coming off it. I put my hands in and started gently taking the wires out of the bag.

The residents were evacuated and spent the night in the a nearby October Cinema. They weren’t allowed to return until the following day. According to resident testimony, Alexandre Sergeiev, director of the Ryazan FSB, visited the residents in the cinema and told them:

Today is your second birthday. There were three bags of explosives timed to go off at half-passed five. You would have all been there and you would all have been blown sky-high.

The Ryazan police photographed the detonator and entered it into evidence before handing the case files over to the FSB. The police investigation led the local public prosecutor to declare a terrorist incident that evening, the 23rd of September. Witness statements enabled identikit images of the suspects to be widely circulated in and around Ryazan as the authorities locked the city down.

The Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defence, Emergency Situations and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters (EMERCOM), led by Sergey Shoygu, announced:

[T]hree bags of sugar mixed with Hexogen, as well as detonators, were found in one of the residential buildings on Novoselov Street.

The use of sugar in combination with RDX (Hexogen) both promotes the ignition of RDX and is a relatively inexpensive way to increase the force of the blast.

Shortly after Tkachenko had defused the device, at approximately 1.30am on the morning of the 23rd, the the local FSB took a 3kg sample of the suspected explosives away for testing.

The FSB said that they conducted three tests using a shotgun cartridge detonator, similar to the one found in Ryazan, but were not able to detonate the substance.

All phone communications in Ryazan were monitored in an effort to find the perpetrators. A telephone operator called Nadezhda Yukhanova intercepted a call destined for the Lubyanka (Moscow headquarters of the FSB). She later testified that the FSB had said:

Is the woman with you? [. . .] Where’s the car? [. . .] Leave Ryazan separately. There are patrols and checkpoints everywhere.

The call reported by Yukhanova, along with visual identification by local witnesses, enabled Ryazan police to quickly locate and detain two of the suspects. No arrests were made because they immediately discovered that the pair were FSB officers. The Ryazan police were ordered to release the FSB agents as the Russian government confirmed that its agents planted the Ryazan device.

THE RYAZAN INVESTIGATION

As the initial news of the Ryazan bomb discovery reached Moscow, Prime Minister Putin reportedly made a bizarre statement. He said that the best thing about events in Ryazan was that it showed that the public were alert to the danger:

The sack with the explosives was noticed, that means there is at least one plus factor. The public is reacting in the right way to the events that are taking place in our country today.

At the time, no one thought that the Ryazan device was anything other than a real bomb. Surely, the best thing about the Ryazan incident was that the residents of Novoselov Street were not murdered in their beds? Why wasn’t Putin happy about that? His statement seemed very odd.

The situation was evolving rapidly. Speaking to the State Duma the Minister of the Interior, Vladimir Rushailo, confirmed that a bomb had been defused and a tragedy averted:

Positive measures are already being taken. One example is the prevention of an explosion in an apartment building in Ryazan.

This was contradicted within the hour by FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev. He said:

There wasn’t an explosion. An explosion wasn’t prevented. [. . .] It wasn’t good work, it was an exercise. There were no explosives, just sugar.

On the 24th, Patrushev followed this up with a TV interview. He repeated that events in Ryazan were part of a drill to “test responses.” Yet Sergey Shoygu (EMERCOM), Vladimir Rushailo (Interior Minister) and Vladimir Putin (Prime Minister) had made no reference to an exercise in the previous 48 hours.

In response to Patrushev’s statement, the Ryazan FSB issued one of their own thoroughly distancing themselves from the claimed training “exercise:”

It has become known that the planting on 22.09.99 of a dummy explosive device was part of an ongoing interregional exercise. This announcement came as a surprise to us and appeared at a moment when the department of the FSB had identified the places of residence in Ryazan of those involved in planting the explosive device and was preparing to detain them.

The Ryazan FSB stressed that they were about to arrest those they held responsible for “planting the explosive device.” They noted that the training exercise narrative only emerged after they were ordered not to arrest the suspects. For a local FSB branch to openly question and seemingly undermine the Lubyanka in this manner was unheard of. It is clear that the Ryazan FSB were not willing to simply go along with the training exercise story.

In a Ryazan local news interview the regional governor said he knew nothing about the alleged FSB exercise. The mayor, Pavel Mamatov, also expressed his disbelief:

They’ve used us as guinea-pigs. Tested Ryazan for lice. I’m not against exercises, I served in the army myself and I took part in them, but I never saw anything like this.

By the 24th September 1999, the 2nd Chechen War was already underway. The full implications of the Ryazan incident had yet to break nationally and the Russian people were still preoccupied what they believed to be a vicious bombing campaign waged by Chechen terrorists.

Speaking in Astana, Kazakhstan, in one of his first televised press conferences, the new Russian Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, knew precisely what to say to capture the mood of the nation:

We will follow the terrorists wherever they go. If they are at the airport we will be there. Excuse me, but if they’re in the shithouse, we will go in there and blow them away. That’s all there is to it. The problem is solved.

His image, as a hard, no-nonsense man of the people, was playing out well with Russian voters. At last, a leader who would take out the bad guys and keep them safe.
With the Chechen war grabbing all the headlines, the Ryazan incident was largely forgotten. That was about to change.

UNRAVELLING RYAZAN

Bomb disposal expert, Yuri Tkachenko, gave an interview to journalist Pavel Voloshin in February 2000, five months after the Ryazan incident, in which he clearly maintained that the analysis he conducted, using a state-of-the-art (for 1999) MO-2 gas analyser, revealed the presence of the explosive RDX (Hexogen). He again confirmed that the detonator was armed and timed. He had no doubt that the Ryazan device was a real bomb.

Voloshin also interviewed the first police officer on the scene Andrei Chernyshev. It was he who had discovered the bomb. He recalled how Novoselov Street quickly became a hive of activity as Interior Ministry and local FSB agents joined the investigation. He was equally clear that everyone present that evening understood that the bomb and the planned attack was real:

No one doubted that the situation was combative. I still have the confidence that these were not exercises.

Voloshin’s article caused a furore. It was at this point that the FSB’s official story changed yet again.

A few weeks after Voloshin published his interview with Tkachenko and Chernyshev, the head of the investigative department of the Ryazan FSB, Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Maksimov, contradicted Voloshin’s piece. Having failed to mention it previously, the FSB now claimed that Tkachenko had not used the $20,000 MO-2 analyser but a different unit called Exprei.

It was not possible to corrupt the readings of the sealed vacuum on the MO-2 analyser but it was possible to contaminate Exprei. This is what Maksimov alleged that Tkachenko had done.

Maksimov claimed that the experienced Tkachenko had caused a false Exprei reading because he had not washed his hands after handling RDX the previous day. He accused Tkachenko of error. Maksimov said that Tkachenko had not worn rubber gloves as they were unavailable due to budget constraints.

Despite having steadfastly maintained his account for months, and categorically stating his certainty about the Ryazan device on numerous occasions, following the statement of his senior commanding officer, Tkachenko changed his mind. He altered his account after losing his job as head of the Engineering and Technical Department and interrogation by the FSB. Tkachenko agreed with Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Maksimov. He said that he could have possibly contaminated the Exprei analyser.

In March 2000 there were still some independent media outlets in Russia capable of genuinely questioning the government. On the 2nd of March 2000 NTV broadcast a public debate in a program called Independent Inquiry.

During the NTV discussion the Director of Investigations for the FSB, Stanislav Voronov, read out a prepared FSB statement signed by both the Interior Ministry and the FSB:

A major operation involving all the members of the Russian Federation was jointly planned by the police and the FSB. The operation was codenamed ‘Anti-Terror Whirlwind.’ It was signed by Patrushev and Rushailo

Speaking on the 23rd September 1999, Interior Minister Rushailo didn’t appear to know anything about the joint exercise he had supposedly authorised. Unwittingly or not, he misled the State Duma.

NTV Audience member Evgueni Savostianov, the former Director of the Moscow FSB, called the whole exercise story “incomprehensible.” He asked FSB spokesman Alexandre Zdanovich why the FSB had not informed Rushailo.

Zdanovich replied:

Well, you know, things can sometimes get muddled during an exercise.

Voloshin’s article and the NTV debate prompted questions from some deputies in the State Duma. Deputy Yuri Shchekochikhin put foward two motions requesting the Ryazan incident to be formally investigated by the Prosecutor General’s Office. Vladimir Putin said that the mere suggestion of FSB complicity was “immoral.”

In April 2000 the state Duma voted to deny the motions. All records appertaining to the Ryazan incident were sealed for 75 years.

THE WEIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

In March 2001 a number if Islamist extremist terror suspects were sentenced in connection with the Buynaksk bombing. No physical, witness or forensic evidence placed any of the accused at the scene of the explosion. All the evidence against them related to general acts of terrorism and the commissioning of terrorism.

All mention of RDX and hexogen was removed from the official apartment bombing narrative following the Ryazan incident. By 2002 the bombs were said to have been ammonium nitrate and aluminium based. It was as if the inital findings never existed and no one ever mentioned RDX (hexogen.)

The supposed mastermind behind the campaign Ibn al-Khattab was allegedly assassinated by the FSB in 2002. Another suspect, Yusuf Krymshamkhalov, was sentenced in 2003 to life imprisonment for his alleged part in the Moscow bombings as was Adam Dekkushev for his suspected role in the Volgodonsk bombing.

The trial of Krymshamkhalov and Dekkushev was heard in secret, without a jury. The convictions were based upon interrogation statements submitted to the court by the FSB.

To date, there is no evidence that any of the Russian apartment bombings were carried out by terrorists. All named suspects have either died or supposedly remain at large. Even the convictions of Krymshamkhalov and Dekkushev were for activities related to the commissioning of terrorism.

There is no evidence that any of the Russian apartment bombs were planted by terrorists. By contrast, the evidence indicating that elements within the FSB orchestrated the attacks is overwhelming.

— The FSB planted a device in Ryazan that was initially disarmed by bomb disposal experts. Ryazan investigators discovered that the bomb was real and identified the explosive as RDX (Hexogen). Ryazan officials presented physical evidence of a timer device with an active explosive charge. It was only months later, after he had spent some time being interrogated by the FSB and had lost his job, that bomb disposal expert Yuri Tkachenko changed his story about the equipment he had used. At no stage did he concede that the the device was anything other than a real bomb, only that his analysis could have been “contaminated.”

— The Ryazan police, local FSB, Ryazan residents and all other officials understood that the device was an active bomb with a functioning timer set to explode at 5.30am.

— Traces of the same RDX explosive were found at other apartment bombings. This was confirmed by the Director of the FSB, the head of EMERCOM and other Russian officials during the initial investigation. The Ryazan bomb appeared to be of the same construction as the other bombs used in the apartment bombings.

— The placement of the Ryazan bomb, targeting a poorer, civilian community and situated to bring down their apartment building, followed exactly the same targetting and victim profile as the other apartment bombs, allegedly planted by terrorists. Even the Buynaksk bombing was directed against innocent families.

— The supposed terrorist campaign ceased following the temporary detention of the FSB agents in Ryazan. There were no more attacks. The exposure of the FSB’s secret training methods coincided precisely with the end of the real terror campaign. It was only once the plot was discovered and the story about an alleged “training exercise” emerged, that the terror campaign ceased.

— The supposed mastermind of the campaign, Ibn al-Khattab, specifically denied his involvement, eschewing the chance to take credit. The only named terrorist group that allegedly claimed responsibility (the Liberation Army of Dagestan) didn’t exist.

— A journalist reported that Russian state officials had told him about “loud terrorist acts” that would deliver “great shocks” to Moscow two months prior to such attacks occurring.

— The speaker of the State Duma received a note from a state official relaying news of the Volgodonsk bombing three days before it happened.

— The Prime Minister of Russia effectively expressed an opinion that the best thing about the Ryazan incident was that it showed the Russian people were living in fear.

— Russian investigators and officials repeatedly identified the detected presence of the explosive RDX at the scenes of the apartment bombings. Following the Ryazan incident, where RDX was once again detected by bomb disposal experts, the FSB and other state officials changed their story and claimed that RDX had never been identified, thoroughly contradicting their own previous statements.

— The “training exercise” story makes no logical sense for four key reasons.

— The device was discovered by chance, thanks to the vigilance of Ryazan citizens. The FSB hid the bomb in the basement but did not alert the Ryazan authorities. They made no effort to trigger the response they claimed they wished to evaluate.

— The FSB did not have any operatives, who knew an alleged training exercise was underway, involved in the Ryazan response. If the bomb was a dummy device (merely bags of sugar), as the FSB claimed, then the Ryazan authorities would have known almost immediately that the whole thing was a hoax. Therefore, there would have been no response to a terrorist incident but rather a considerably less urgent investigation into a fake bomb threat.

— The FSB claimed that the purpose of the alleged Ryazan exercise was to train Russian security services to react effectively to a terrorist attack and to test their responsiveness. But Russian security services were already actively engaged in responding to real terrorist attacks. The FSB were seemingly testing and training their troops to fight a battle while they were in the act of fighting it.

If making such an appraisal was the FSB’s objective, it could simply have assessed the many responses that the Russian emergency and security services were already engaged in at the time. The FSB itself was part of those responses. In terms of understanding how Russian security services respond to terrorist attacks, the FSB added nothing and had nothing to learn from the supposed Ryazan “training exercise.”

— On the night of the 22nd of September 1999 the only three people in Ryazan who allegedly knew a live training exercise was underway were the three FSB officers who planted the device. Even the head of the Ryazan FSB had no idea.

There is no evidence that the Lubyanka FSB had any other assets in Ryazan. Its subsequent claimed assessment of “the response” could only have been based upon the analysis of communication intercepts or reports from its local office. But the local Ryazan FSB office was not “evaluating” the response. It was part of the response.

The elements within the FSB who were responsible for planting the device had no assets on the ground in Ryazan capable of monitoring the supposed training exercise.

WHO BENEFITED FROM THE RUSSIAN APARTMENT BOMBINGS?

Ryazan is not a “smoking gun” that proves FSB guilt but, seeing as all relevant records were sealed by the Russian state for 75 years, nor is such evidence likely to be revealed. The Russian political class certainly doesn’t want the matter to be investigated further.

Prior to the apartment bombings Vladimir Putin was seen as yet another Yeltsin flunky who was destined to go down with the ship. He had virtually no public profile, the State Duma was aligned against him and the chances of him winning a popular vote in a national election were effectively zero.

The Russian apartment bombings changed all that and made Putin a national hero. They created the legend of Putin, the “great leader.” He had the motive to commit the crime.

The weight of circumstantial evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that the FSB orchestrated a highly coordinated terror campaign to change the Russian political landscape. Such a plan would have taken many months to put together. Putin was the director of the FSB for the year leading up to the Russian apartment bombings. He had the means to commit the crime.

Putin left the FSB to become the Russian Prime Minister, making him the main focal point for public attention during a national crisis. That crisis arrived almost as soon as he did, leaving his opponents barely any time to react. Putin was in the right place at the right time and he capitalised upon the crisis to seize power. He had the opportunity to commit the crime.

Putin had the motive, means and opportunity to order elements within the FSB to carry out the Russian apartment bombings. He then benefited politically from the cold-blooded murder of more than 300 Russian men, women and children. While some may hope for a leader to stand against the emerging globalist order, Putin isn’t worthy of anyone’s trust.

About the Author

You can read more of Iain’s work at his blog IainDavis.com (Formerly InThisTogether) or on UK Column or follow him on Twitter. His new book Pseudopandemic, is now available, in both in kindle and paperback, from Amazon and other sellers. Or you can claim a free copy by subscribing to his newsletter.

Article cross-posted from Off-Guardian.